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Internal Revenue Code Section 4061 (b),
Manufacturers' Excise Tax on Parts and
Accessories of Motor Vehicles*
SUMMARY
"The present excise taxes, for the most part, were initially levied
as emergency revenue-raising measures at the time of the Korean
War, or World War 11, or the depression of the 1930's. As a result,
they were not developed on any systematic basis and are often
discriminatory in their application to the taxed industries or to
purchasers of the taxed products."'
Born of crisis and nurtured by crises, Internal Revenue Code
Section 4061(b), dealing with manufacturers excise tax on motor
vehicle parts and accessories, together with its predecessors, from a
modest and innocuous start in 1932 (Appendix A), developed by
1964 into an all-encompassing monster. This development, legisla-
tively reflected in a mass of amendments over the years, adminis-
* Editor's Note: The author of the Comment which follows has rec-
ommended that Section 4061 (b), and particularly 4061 (b) (2), of the In-
ternal Revenue Code be revised to exempt light truck parts and accessories
from the imposition of the excise tax now prescribed by that section.
Representative Alphonzo Bell from California, with whom the matter has
been discussed, has volunteered to introduce legislation to that end.
1. H. Rep. No. 433, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965 U.S. Code Cong. and
Ad. News 1645.
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tratively in regulations of the Internal Revenue Service, and judi-
cially via the case law route, peaked in 1964.
In 1964 Congress took an important first step in attenuating the
scope of the section. On October 13, 1964, it enacted Public Law
Number 88-653 removing the tax on rebuilt parts and accessories.
This was accomplished by adding Section 4063 (c) to the Internal
Revenue Code.2
From there it was all down hill. In 1965 Congress removed the
tax on all auto parts and accessories,3 thereby, retaining it only on
truck and bus parts and accessories. The statute has existed es-
sentially in this truncated form until the present time.
It should be noted that the tax was removed from auto parts
and accessories in 1964 and 1965, but the tax on the automobile
itself continued in force until 1971. In 1971 the tax imposed on au-
tomobiles was removed. 4 Hence, the sequence of events was that
first auto parts were excluded from the tax imposition, and then
the vehicle exclusion came into being. The Revenue Act of 1971,
additionally, excluded light-duty trucks from imposition of the
tax. Light-duty trucks were defined as those "having a gross ve-
hicle weight of 10,000 pounds or less (as determined under regula-
tions prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate).,5 Basically,
this covered the popular one half and three quarter ton pickups.(
The legislative intent behind the exclusion of the light trucks
was that such trucks really, to a substantial degree, fulfill the func-
tion of the passenger automobile in that they are used as a means
of personal transportation.7
In light of the above, it would be both logical and sensible for
the tax to be removed from the replacement parts and accessories
associated with light trucks. Incongruously, however, as Section
4061(b) exists today, despite the fact that light trucks are not taxed
(nor are the parts or accessories taxed when they are on the trucks
2. "Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, the
tax imposed under section 4061 (b) shall not apply in the case of rebuilt
parts or accessories." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4063 (c).
3. Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 201(b) (2).
4. Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 401.
5. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4061 (a) (2).
6. H. Rep. No. 92-533, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1971 U.S. Code Cong. and
Ad. News 1966.
7. Id., at 1826, 1831.
at the time of the original sale), light truck parts and accessories
sold subsequently are excise taxed.
This is an anomalous situation in that automobiles and/or their
parts and accessories are exempt from the manufacturers excise
tax. Light trucks also have been excluded by the 1971 Act be-
cause they are used like automobiles. Therefore, they are treated
like automobiles for excise tax purposes. The replacement parts
and after-market accessories for light trucks, however, continue to
be taxable.
This is especially puzzling when one recognizes that, historically,
the tendency has always been to impose the tax on the vehicle
first and then on the parts and accessories. On the removal side,
the pattern has been to remove the tax on the parts and accessories
sooner than on the vehicle. The truck situation is contra to that
pattern.
At any rate, Section 4061(b) currently imposes the tax on the
parts and accessories of light trucks and of heavy trucks and buses.
Section 4061 (a) imposes the tax only on heavy trucks and buses.
Viewed in an historical light, it would be appropriate for the Con-
gress to repeal Part I of Subchapter A of Chapter 32 of 26 United
States Code. This would eliminate the manufacturers excise tax
from all motor vehicles, their parts, and accessories. As a practi-
cal matter, Section 4063 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, an
exemption section, has already exempted certain trucks and buses.,
At the very least, to correct the exclusion omission vis-a-vis light
trucks, Section 4061(b) (2) should be amended to read as follows:
(2) No tax shall be imposed under this subsection upon any part
or accessory which is suitable for use (and ordinarily is used) on
or in connection with, or as a component part of, [any article enu-
merated in subsection (a) (2)], any chassis or body for a passenger
automobile, any chassis or body for a trailer or semi-trailer suit-
able for use in connection with a passenger automobile, or a house
trailer.
The bracketed portion inserted into the present section as shown
would accomplish the purpose and would effect the suggested cor-
rection.
INTRODUCTION AND EARLY HISTORY
During the depression, by Acts of June 6, 1932 (Appendix A),
Congress enacted Section 606 which provided an excise tax to be
imposed upon "automobile truck chassis and automobile truck
bodies (including in both cases parts or accessories therefor sold
8. See § 4063(a).
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on or in connection therewith or with the sale thereof), 2 per
centum." The tax was imposed upon those articles sold by "the
manufacturer, producer, or importer" at two percent "of the price
for which so sold." (Appendix A).
Even in this essentially simple form, the statute portended some
of the problems that were to arise later. The tax was a "manufac-
turer's" tax. What and who is a "manufacturer," for example, and
what is "the price for which so sold?" Subsequent Code sections
and cases have dealt extensively, and eventually not entirely sat-
isfactorily, with these questions.
The Revenue Act of 1938, expanded Section 606 by amendment,
differentiated between trucks and passenger automobiles as to rate
of tax (two percent on the former, and three percent on the latter),
and, more importantly, added subsection (c) which imposed the
tax (two percent) on automobile and truck parts and accessories
sold separately from the vehicles themselves. (Appendix A). The
addition of subsection (c) further complicated the problems that
were to arise. In addition to the two questions referred to above,
i.e., the one pertaining to the identity and nature of the manu-
facturer and the one relating to the selling or taxable price, sub-
section (c) introduced other questions that were not only in addi-
tion to, but, at the same time, also were interwoven with the origi-
nal two questions. What is an automobile truck part or accessory?
What is the status of a part or accessory that has been rebuilt,
reconditioned, or repaired? What, if anything, shall the tax be
on a rebuilt part that employs tax-paid components in the re-
building process? These are examples of the kinds of knotty ques-
tions that were generated by the appearance of the tax on auto-
mobile and truck parts and accessories.
It is foreseeable that the practical difficulties in resolving these
questions would be enormous. The Treasury Department would en-
counter troublesome administrative problems in defining what con-
stitutes a taxable operation, and the prospective taxpayers, on the
whole, were small companies scattered throughout the country.
Generally, the latter were not sufficiently sophisticated to know
how to comply with the tax or cope with the Treasury regula-
tions and definitions on an administrative or legal level. 9
9. Note statements to this effect made in S. Rep. No. 1251, 88th Cong.,
2nd Sess., 1964-2 Cum. Bull. 870, 872, reproduced in Appendix C.
The statute contained in the Acts of 1932, as amended, became
part of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, identified therein as 26
United States Code Section 3403 (c) of Chapter 29, Subchapter A,
i.e., Section 3403, subsection (c) became the successor to subsec-
tion (c) of the 1932 Acts as amended. (Appendix A). Reference
to Appendix A will demonstrate how elaborate the subsection had
become by the last quarter of 1955. The concept of the taxability
of rebuilt parts had become incorporated within the statute by that
time. Section 3403 (c) was the forerunner of and became Section
4061 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. (Appendix A).
On the whole, the nodal points in the development of the statute
were historical points of crisis in the country. As a result, the
taxes were not developed on any systematic basis, and they were
often discriminatory in their application to the taxed industries or
to purchasers of the taxed products.10
UNITED STATES V. ARMATURE EXCHANGE, INC."
This important 1941 case set the tone for many of the judicial, ad-
ministrative, and, to some extent, even legislative attitudes in sub-
sequent years regarding the definition of a manufacturer or pro-
ducer, and also regarding the taxable status of rebuilt parts.
The plaintiff taxpayer brought an action against the United
States of America to recover $1,452.30 assessed and paid as manu-
facturer's excise taxes on the sale of armatures. The taxes were
assessed against the taxpayer by virtue of Section 606(c) of the
Revenue Act of 1932 as amended. (Appendix A).
The taxpayer acquired burned and worn-out armatures, stripped
them to the core, and by various machine and hand operations,
through the use of the old core and new material, turned out and
sold what it called "rebuilt armatures." These armatures were
sold outright to the trade with the taxpayer sometimes taking
burned and worn-out armatures in exchange and sometimes not.
The taxpayer contended that it was in the business simply of
reconstructing and restoring armatures as opposed to manufactur-
ing or producing armatures. The trial court supported the tax-
payer's contention and rendered judgment in its favor. The gov-
ernment appealed.
The appellate court reversed in a unanimous decision.
10. See first paragraph under "Summary" in this COMMENT.
11. 116 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1941), rehearing denied, cert. denied, 313
U.S. 573.
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The lower court decided that the rebuilt articles were not "man-
ufactured or produced" asserting that to be "manufactured or pro-
duced" there must be a "new and different" article at the comple-
tion of the taxpayer's operations.
The appellate court rejected this criterion holding that the oper-
ations involved constituted "manufacture or production" within
the meaning of the statute. The significant segments of its opinion
were:
1 2
1) There was no justification for reading into the statute in-
volved the qualification that the articles "manufactured or pro-
duced" had to have been so manufactured or produced entirely
from new or virgin raw materials.
2) The discarded armatures having lost their function as useful
articles as well as their commercial value as such, when acquired
for use in the manufacturing and production of articles of com-
merce, bear the same relationship to the completed armatures as
the purchase of unused materials would bear to the completed ar-
ticles. The article resulting from the use of the discarded core
with new materials through the employment of skill, labor, and
machinery is a manufactured and produced article of commerce.
3) Treasury Regulations (Reg. 46, Art. 4) of 1932, under Section
606 of the Revenue Act of 1932, had defined "producer" as including
a person who produces a taxable article by combining or assem-
bling two or more articles. Subsequent to the appearance of the
definition Congress had reenacted the statute several times. "Un-
der the established rule Congress must be taken to have approved
the administrative construction and thereby to have given it the
force of law.' 1 3
4) Certainly if new parts had been purchased and combined
to make the armatures, that would have constituted "manufactur-
ing or producing." There can be no difference just because the
parts utilized were used or discarded parts.
This case did two things at the same time. It defined the scope
of the term "manufacturer or producer" and also established the
concept that rebuilding is "manufacturing or producing." It is in
12. Id., at 971.
13. Helvering v. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 306 U.S. 110, 115 (1938).
this latter area tnat the most confusing and greatest bulk of the
problems associated with Section 4061(b) have appeared.
MANUFACTURER, PRODUCER, OR IMPORTER
The statute imposes the tax on articles sold by the "manufac-
turer, producer, or importer." The statute itself does not define
the three words. They are defined in the cases, a typical example
of which, in the "rebuilding" context, is United States v. Armature
Exchange, Inc.14 described above. Apart from the "rebuilding"
context, the courts have handled the definitions in a variety of
ways, and not altogether consistently.
It is universally held that the tax itself is imposed on the manu-
facturer and vendor and not upon the purchaser.15 The manufac-
turer's excise tax is a tax liability of the manufacturer. It is not a
liability of either the intermediate dealer or of the ultimate pur-
haser.16
In a situation where one person manufactures or produces a tax-
able article for another who furnishes materials and retains title
to the article, the latter for whom the article is manufactured or
produced, not the actual manufacturer, is considered to be the
"manufacturer" for purposes of Section 4061 (b) .17
In another situation, the taxpayer's patented booster device for
suspension springs was fabricated by a company under contract
with the taxpayer and sold to the taxpayer at the contract price.
The taxpayer then repackaged the device, added instructions for
installation and a warranty, and resold them. The taxpayer was
held not to be the "manufacturer" of the devices within the pro-
visions of Section 4061 (b). 1 No special meaning is intended by the
word "manufacturer" in Section 4061 (b), and patentees or licensees
are not per se "manufacturers."' 0 But see Boise Nat. Leasing, Inc.
v. United States20 for a contrary holding.
A company making custom-made seat covers for used automo-
biles by chalking, marking, cutting, and sewing the covers was a
14. 116 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1941), rehearing denied, cert. denied, 313
U.S. 573.
15. Martin's Auto Trimming, Inc. v. Riddell, 283 F.2d 503 (Cir. Cal.
1960).
16. Undercofler v. Capital Auto Co., 111 Ga. App. 709, 143 S.E.2d 206
(1965).
17. Import Wholesalers Corp. v. United States, 368 F.2d 577 (Ct. Cl.
1966).
18. Air Life Co. v. United States, 418 F.2d 558 (Cir. Mich. 1969).
19. Id.
20. 389 F.2d 633 (Cir. Idaho 1968).
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"manufacturer" for excise tax purposes.21 Where a company made
automobile seat covers on special orders of customers, who selected
the material to be used from fabrics carried in stock by the com-
pany, the company was the "manufacturer ' 22 for the purposes of
Section 4061(b). But see Johnnie & Mack, Inc. v. United States23
holding that an automobile repair shop making custom seat covers
on orders was not a "manufacturer" of automobile accessories
within the meaning of Section 4061 (b).
A taxpayer who purchased glass from glass manufacturers in
cut sizes and who then cut the glass, ground off the edges, and de-
livered the glass to customers for use in automobiles was not a
"manufacturer" within Section 4061 (b).24
An "importer," for excise tax purposes, is the first purchaser res-
ident in the United States who arranges, as a principal not as an
agent, for goods to be brought into the United States. 25 This ap-
plies to a used automobile dealer's first sales in the United States
of used automobiles imported from abroad.26
REBUILDING, RECONDITIONING, REPAIRING
As described in United States v. Armature Exchange, Inc.,27 re-
built automobile parts and accessories are "manufactured and pro-
duced" for the purposes of Section 4061(b). The question that is
immediately conjured up is, "When does an old or used automobile
part or accessory that has been restored become a rebuilt part?"
One can conceive of all gradations of restoration. Cleaning up
an old part or painting it or replating it constitutes restoration of
the part. But do any of these operations or combinations of them
constitute rebuilding? When do they fall short of being rebuild-
ing? It is clear that a lot of arbitrary rules of thumb and criteria
21. Masao Hirasuma v. McKenney, 245 F.2d 98 (Cir. Hawaii 1957).
22. United States v. Keeton, 238 F.2d 878 (Cir. Va. 1956), cert. denied,
353 U.S. 973.
23. 151 F. Supp. 748 (D. Fla. 1957).
24. Earl Glass Co. v. United States, 197 F. Supp. 707 (D. Nev. 1961).
25. Handley Motor Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 361 (Ct. Cl. 1964);
Weiner v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 413 (D. Cal. 1966); Import Whole-
salers Corp. v. United States, 368 F.2d 577 (Ct. Cl. 1966); U.S. Truck Sales
Co. v. United States, 229 F.2d 693 (Cir. Ohio 1956).
26. Smith v. United States, 319 F.2d 776 (Cir. Tex. 1963).
27. 116 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1941), rehearing denied, cert. denied, 313
U.S. 573.
would arise around these questions. The cases have arisen in pro-
fusion and have handled the problem with confusion. Typical ex-
amples are as follows:
1) Reassembled generators containing armatures rewound by
reassemblers held "manufactured" and hence taxable. 28
2) Rebuilt clutch assemblies held taxable as "manufactured"
articles.2 9
3) Taxpayers who made rear fenders from the steel sheet dur-
ing modification of trucks in order to convert them into specialty
vehicles were "manufacturers" of fenders even though the fenders
so fabricated were not assembled, stocked, or sold as independent
parts or accessories. 30
4) Straightening, grinding, stripping old chrome, repolishing,
and replating of damaged and otherwise unusable automobile
bumpers constituted "manufacturing" under Section 4061 (b) .1
5) Rebuilding of automobile engines constituted "manufactur-
ing" requiring the imposition of the tax upon sales of the rebuilt
engines.32
6) Rebuilding automobile engines from a combination of sal-
vaged parts and newly manufactured parts which were purchased
from manufacturers who had already paid the tax on these newly
manufactured parts, and subsequent sale of these engines raised an
issue as to whether the totality of these operations constituted
manufacturing within the meaning of Section 4061 (b) .33
7) Taxpayer who sold automobile connecting rods prepared by
rebabbitting or regrinding used rods was held to be a "manufac-
urer."34
8) Acquiring worn-out armatures, stripping them to the core,
and through the use of the old core and new material, turning out
rebuilt armatures held to be manufacturing within the section.8 5
9) Where the only new material used by the taxpayer in re-
conditioning of automobile storage batteries were wooden or plastic
28. Exchange Parts Co. of Fort Worth v. United States, 279 F.2d 251
(Ct. Cl. 1960).
29. Id.
30. Whattoff v. United States, 355 F.2d 473 (Cir. Iowa 1966).
31. Blake v. United States, 355 F.2d 23 (Cir. Tex. 1966).
32. De Boisblanc v. Usry, 272 F.2d 11 (Cir. La. 1959).
33. Hartley v. United States, 252 F.2d 262 (Cir. Tex. 1958).
34. Clawson & Bals v. United States, 182 F.2d 402 (Cir. Ill. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 883.
35. United States v. Armature Exchange, 116 F.2d 969 (9th Cir. 1941),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 573.
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insulators, roofing tar, battery acid, and asphalt paint, all of which
were either tax-paid or tax exempt items, and where the lead
plates in the cells were not replaced, the operations did not con-
stitute "manufacturing" for tax purposes.36
10) Sales of rebuilt automobile motors were held taxable even
though they were made up of component parts some of which were
taxable to their manufacturers.8 7
The Internal Revenue Service attempted to cope with the param-
eters of the possible permutations and combinations of operations
and processes by issuing Treasury Decision 6648.38 Treasury Regu-
lation 48.4061(b)-3, a part of Treasury Decision 6648, defined Re-
built, Reconditioned, Or Repaired Parts Or Accessories, reproduced
as Appendix B.
Insofar as the manufacturers excise tax was concerned, neither
reconditioned nor repaired parts or accessories were subject. Only
the rebuilt articles were. The contests between the Service and
taxpayers resolved themselves, for the most part where restorative
activities were concerned, into arguments as to whether what was
in issue was rebuilding or reconditioning or repairing. The de-
tailed description of the replacement bumper business, infra, illus-
trates the course that argument might have taken in a particular
case.
REPLACEMENT AUTOMOBILE BUMPERS
The situation in the replacement automobile bumper industry is
illustrative of the situation that prevailed generally in the rebuilt
automobile parts and accessories industries, insofar as Section
4061 (b) is concerned. That industry is a microcosm of the automo-
bile and truck parts and accessories industries, generally. Accord-
ingly, a description of its experiences, vis-a-vis the manufacturers
excise tax would be analogous, if not identical, to that of all those
businesses generically termed, "rebuilders." Furthermore, the
writer had, for many years, been involved in an interrelated fam-
ily of corporations exclusively devoted to the making of these
bumpers and was personally involved with virtually all of the
36. Martin Tire Co. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 316 (D. Fla. 1955).
37. Hackendorf v. United States, 243 F.2d 760 (Cir. Okla. 1957), cert.
denied, 355 U.S. 826.
38. 1963-1 Cum. Bull. 197.
problems associated with Section 4061(b) and their impact on this
interesting industry and is, therefore, qualified to describe the sit-
uation quite authoritatively.
By way of introductory information, the replacement bumpers
are produced by "restoring" damaged bumpers, i.e., bumpers that
have been damaged as a result of motor vehicle accidents. The
damaged bumper is called the "core." The bumper is restored by
straightening the core employing presses, hammers, and other im-
pact tools and reforming it to its original shape and configuration
by the use of templates, molds, and jigs and fixtures. The rough
areas are smoothed out using the conventional auto body shop
techniques of dollying and disc grinding. This entire procedure is
called "straightening." Next, the old chromium plate is stripped
leaving intact on the bumper the substrate of nickel or copper and
nickel. Then the bumper undergoes one or more polishing oper-
ations after which the usual sequence of operations is plating with
copper, copper buffing, nickel plating, and finally chromium plat-
ing. The foregoing is done so skillfully that there is no discern-
ible visible difference between this restored bumper and the origi-
nal factory bumper that was on the vehicle.
This bumper "restoring" industry came into existence in the late
1940's and the early 1950's due to certain changes in the engineering
principles of the automobile manufacturing industry. Prior to
World War II, all auto bumpers were made of heat-treated, hard-
ened steel because manufacturers felt that this was the best way
to create something that would protect the car in the event of a col-
lision. Also, in those days, bumpers were fairly simple in design
and comparatively inexpensive. After the war, the engineering
departments of automobile manufacturers changed their approach
deciding that if bumpers were made of soft metal, they would ab-
sorb most of the impact shock thus protecting the car and its oc-
cupants to a much greater extent. The bumper became an ex-
pendable portion of the car. At the same time, as cars became big-
ger and bigger and more expensive, the bumper became larger,
more ornate, and proportionately a more costly part of the car.
Since the soft metal of the bumpers could now be reworked, it be-
came commercially expedient and financially feasible to "restore"
or "recondition" and thereby reuse damaged automobile bumpers
that were previously scrapped. Thus, a change in engineering
principles made possible the birth of this new replacement bumper
industry.
The bumpers were welcomed by the prime market, the autobody
and fender shops and by the insurance companies who eventually
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paid most of the bills. The reason for this was that these bumpers
were priced considerably below those of the original equipment
manufacturer. The lower price structure was made possible be-
cause of the savings associated with receiving the raw material
gratuitously and because of a very simple distribution pattern em-
ployed by the industry.
Initially a craft-like approach was employed by the industry. A
damaged bumper would be picked up, restored, and returned to
the customer. As a result, usually many days passed before the
bumper got back to the car from which it had come. Eventually,
members of the industry acquired old damaged bumpers of all
types and models, restored them, and put them into inventory.
At this stage, it became possible for a customer to phone in an or-
der and have it filled at once from stock. The bumper company,
as a condition of the sale, required that when it delivered the re-
placement bumper, the customer surrender the damaged bumper
which in turn was reworked and put into inventory. The indus-
try, at that point in time, became known in the trade as the bumper
exchange business, and it expanded rapidly.
As a consequence of the expansion, the existence of the industry
and the excise tax possibilities associated therewith filtered into
the various local districts of the Internal Revenue Service.
There was little initial agreement among agents of the Service
who happened to be assigned to audit any of the replacement
bumper companies. With uncertainty, some of them characterized
the bumpers as taxable and others as non-taxable. Usually, when-
ever the status was judged to be taxable the ensuing arguments
at the agent's level resulted in a request by the company or an of-
fer by the agent that a ruling from higher-up be made.
The various characterizing words, "rebuilt," "reconditioned," and
"repaired" defined as they formally were in Regulation Section
48.4061 (b)-3 (Appendix B), and prior to that in Section 40.4061
(b)-3(a) of the Manufacturers and Retailers Excise Tax Regula-
tions, began to be used in connection with the bumper makers-
the Service referring to them more and more as "rebuilders" and
the bumper people referring to themselves as bumper "recondi-
tioners." The latter reached the point where their local and na-
tional associations were all called associations "Of Bumper Recon-
ditioners," and all price lists and other distributed literature made
reference only to bumper "reconditioning."
The proselytizing continued until finally the Internal Revenue
Service issued Revenue Ruling 62-162 holding that the restoration
operation, described above, accompanied by an exchange sale con-
stituted rebuilding, hence was manufacturing under Section 4061
(b), and hence was taxable. Implied recognition of the indecisive
prior position of the Service in this regard, and of the many local
confusing and contradictory prior holdings, appears in the pro-
spective application of the ruling. The last paragraph of the Reve-
nue Ruling said, "This Revenue Ruling will not be applied to sales
made prior to November 1, 1962, .... " The slate was wiped
clean, but the Service had given notice that from that time on the
bumper industry was made up of bumper "rebuilders."
Revenue Ruling 62-162, instead of clearing the air, generated a
new category of confusion, probably worse than that which had
centered around the question of whether the industry was com-
posed of "rebuilders" or "reconditioners."
An eight percent tax was a prohibitive price addition. The Rul-
ing pointed the way (as did Section 48.4061 (b) -3, Appendix B)
to escape the tax by "repairing" instead of "rebuilding." The
difference is a simple one. One who might otherwise be a "re-
builder" becomes a "repairer" by the simple expedient of returning
a "bumper belonging to the owner of an automobile for his personal
use." (Revenue Ruling 62-162). In other words, do the customer's
own bumper and return it.
The second approach was that relating to the "price for which so
sold." Eight percent of what? So all kinds of intermediate selling
companies arose leading to Section 421639 squabbles between com-
panies and Service auditors.
Between problems relating to the concept of "repairer" vs. "re-
builder," to how the bumper company adequately sustained its
burden of demonstrating that invoiced items marked "customer's
own car" were indeed that, and to those involving constructive
pricing, the situation reached a new acme of chaos until the Con-
gress resolved the problem by enacting Section 4063 (c) 40 in 1964
39. This refers to Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 4216, a section de-
voted to defining the price for which an article is sold for excise tax pur-
poses. The section contains an elaborate "constructive sale price" subsec-
tion, subsection (b), (1) through (6) designed to define what the "price
for which so sold" is to be under a variety of possible circumstances in-
cluding, for example, the price of an article sold otherwise than through
an arm's length transaction at less than fair market price.
40. See note 2, supra.
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which repealed the tax on rebuilt parts and accessories once and
for all.
Clean up of in process audits proceeded quickly with the Service
liberally compromising along the way to get rid of them.
As an anti-climax, a 1964 district court of Texas case 41 holding
with the Service that bumper restoration was "rebuilding" and,
therefore, "manufacturing" was affirmed by an appellate court in
1966.42
By extending what has been described about the bumper busi-
ness to all the replacement auto and truck parts industries simi-
larly situated in connection with Section 4061 (b), a clear concept
evolves as to the enormity of the problems that existed up to the
time of the 19644 and 196544 repeal enactments.
It should be pointed out that the similarity between the replace-
ment automobile bumper industry and all of the other after-mar-
ket rebuilt parts and accessories industries holds up even as to the
size characteristics of the member companies. On the overall scale
of American industry, the bumper rebuilders are small businesses,
most of them are really entrepreneurially operated in the old fash-
ioned ideal of the American business. This is also true of prac-
tically all the companies who produce rebuilt parts and accessories
for automobiles and trucks.
PARTS OR AccEssoRIEs
Every version of the statute has imposed the tax on "parts or
accessories." (Appendix A). By "parts or accessories" is meant
those articles generally associated with the motor vehicles them-
selves and the latter typically are those enumerated in subsection
(a) (1). (See, for example, the wording of the current version of
Section 4061 (b) in Appendix A). Ascertaining what are such
"parts or accessories" for the purposes of Section 4061(b) is compli-
cated by the fact that motor vehicle owners are apt to, and do,
adapt every conceivable kind of accessory item to the vehicle.
This has necessitated an extensive classification system by the
Service.
41. Blake v. United States, 249 F. Supp. 296 (D. Tex. 1964).
42. Blake v. United States, 355 F.2d 23 (Cir. Tex. 1966).
43. Pub. L. No. 88-653, Internal Revenue Code of 1954, § 4063 (c) added.
44. Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 201(b) (2).
Judicially, parts and accessories subject to the tax have been
discussed as follows:
1) Are refrigerator units, mounted on truck or trailer bodies,
operated from the trucks own power, and used for the commercial
transportation of perishable products and frozen food, commercial
refrigeration units or auto parts and accessories? A 1967 Court of
Claims held that the units were not subject to the tax but were
commercial refrigerator units.45
2) Pickup coaches manufactured by the taxpayer to be trans-
ported in the bed of pickup trucks for temporary mobile housing
were not "automobile truck bodies" or "automobile accessories"
within the Section.48
3) Baby bottle warmers capable of being operated from the
cigarette lighter of an automobile are subject to the tax.47
4) An electric sign designed to be attached to the top of a taxi-
cab is not an auto part or accessory for the purpose of the Section.4 8
5) Radio antennae, designed to be attached to automobiles, are
taxable under the Section.49
6) Car beds for infants having many non-automotive uses, were
held taxable as parts or accessories because they were primarily
designed, advertised, and sold for use in automobiles.50 But in
another district, the same year, there was a holding that if an ar-
ticle that is used on automobiles is equally adapted and commonly
used for other purposes it will not be an automobile part within
the Section.5' And batteries designed and manufactured specifi-
cally for industrial use as a component part of industrial machin-
ery and equipment, and tractor batteries specifically designed for
use in farm tractors, identified as such and sold as such, were held
not subject to tax under 4061(b) even though the batteries might
be used in motor vehicles of a taxable classification. 52
7) What constitutes automobile accessories for the purposes of
45. U.S. Thermo Control v. United States, 372 F.2d 964 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
46. United States v. King Trailer Co., 350 F.2d 947 (Cir. Cal. 1965).
47. Aron v. United States, 259 F.2d 757 (Cir. Cal. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 866.
48. Smith v. McDonald, 214 F.2d 920 (Cir. Pa. 1954).
49. Van Norman Industries, Inc. v. United States, 361 F.2d 992 (Ct. Cl.
1966).
50. Rose-Derry Co. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 26 (D. Mass. 1965).
51. Crown Products Co. v. United States, 239 F. Supp. 1009 (D. Neb.
1965).
52. Grant v. White, 219 F. Supp. 774 (D. Ill. 1963).
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the tax depends upon the facts of each case.53
The code itself specifically classifies certain articles as parts for
the purposes of Section 4061 (b) .4 The Service has attempted to
amplify Section 4061(b) and Section 4062 by means of the regula-
tions route,55 the result being a rather extensive list of parts and
accessories possibly subject to the tax.
The Code itself also includes an exemption section 56 listing
articles specifically exempt from the tax imposed by Section 4061
(a) and (b). Prior to 1965 the list of exempt articles was just
house trailers or tractors. A 1965 amendment expanded the list of
exemptions by substituting camper coaches and bodies for self-
propelled mobile homes, feed, seed, and fertilizer equipment,
house trailers, and small three wheeled trucks.5 7
The trend in attenuating the scope of Section 4061(b) has been
consistent since 1964. Not only has this been manifested by the
repeal of the tax on rebuilt parts and accessories 8 and by the 1965
repeal of the tax on all automobile parts and accessories 9 but also,
as indicated above, by an expansion of the exemption section, Sec-
tion 4063 (a).
THE PRICE FOR WHICH So SOLD
The tax imposed by Section 4061(b) is currently "eight percent
of the price for which so sold." (Appendix A). The words, "the
price for which so sold," have always appeared in the statute. This
means that once the identity of the manufacturer, producer, or
importer has been established, the tax is imposed as a percentage
of that identified party's selling price. That "selling price" base,
as a readily ascertainable quantity, is complicated by a variety of
factors among which are the following:
1) What items of cost may be excluded from the tax base?
53. Benmatt Organization v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 511 (D. Cal.
1955).
54. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4062.
55. See, e.g., 1963-1 Curn. Bull. 197, 205, et seq., and note 42, supra.
56. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4063.
57. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4063(a) and especially (1), (2),
(3), and (4) thereunder.
58. Pub. L. No. 88-653, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4063 (c).
59. Pub. L. No. 89-44, § 201(b) (2).
2) What is the tax base of articles sold at retail or on consign-
ment as compared with the tax base of those sold at wholesale?
Since the tax is imposed just one time, i.e., on the first sale, the
discriminatory implications inherent in this question are appar-
ent.
3) What is the tax base of articles sold from a manufacturing
company to a controlled interrelated company and, therefore, at
a price other than a fair market price?
Recognition of the complications extant in the manufacturer's
selling price concept by Congress led to an extensive codification
of the definition of price.6 0 Section 4216, a complex section, is a
detailed result of Congress' effort in this regard. All the questions
noted above are considered in the context of the broad regulatory
powers accorded to the "Secretary or his delegate" because of the
recognition of the complexity of the problem of completely ade-
quately defining "the price for which so sold."
The extensive nature of Congress' effort, in this regard, is ex-
emplified by Section 4216(f) which concerns the exclusion of lo-
cal advertising charges from the tax base sales price. A charge
for local advertising may be excluded from the manufacturers'
sales price if:
1) The charge does not exceed five percent of the manufac-
turers' price for the article exclusive of the charge for local adver-
sing.
2) It is made as a separate advertising charge at the time of
the sale of the article.
3) It is intended to be refunded to the purchaser or any subse-
quent vendee of the purchaser.
The local advertising that is excludable is limited to radio, tele-
vision, or newspaper advertising, and to that advertising which
states the name of the article and the retail shop at which that ar-
ticle can be purchased.
Even more extensively defined in the statute, in Section 4216(b),
is what is termed "constructive sale price." Constructive sale price
is an artificial tax base price established to get a uniform tax on
the same or similar articles where these are sold by manufacturers
to different classes or levels of customers, such as wholesalers, re-
tailers, consumers, etc. or where special sales relationships exist.
In general, it covers sales of articles sold at prices other than
wholesale (e.g., retail), consignment sales, and sales made other
60. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4216.
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than through arm's length transactions at less than fair market
value.
Section 4216(b) (2) codifies the special rule that if an article is
sold at retail or to a retailer and if:
1) The manufacturer, producer, or importer of such articles
regularly sells such articles at retail, or to retailers, as the case
may be;
2) The manufacturer, producer, or importer of such articles
regularly sells such articles to one or more wholesale distributor
in arm's length transactions, and he establishes that his prices in
such cases are determined without regard to any tax benefit;
3) In the case of articles upon which tax is imposed under Sec-
tion 4061(a) (relating to trucks, buses, tractors, etc.), the normal
method of sales for such articles in the industry is not to sell
such articles at retail or to retailers; and
4) The transaction is an arm's length transaction; then the tax
shall be computed at the lower of the price for which the article is
sold or the highest price for which such articles are sold by such
manufacturer, producer, or importer to wholesale distributors.
Even further, Section 4216(b) (3) establishes a ninety percent
constructive price rule; Section 4216 (b) (5) establishes a ninety-
eight point five percent constructive price rule; and in Revenue
Ruling 62-68;61 the Internal Revenue Service established a ninety-
five percent constructive price rule to cover certain situations that
the ninety percent and ninety-eight point five percent rules did not.
Where rebuilt parts and accessories were concerned, there were
further complications. For example, where a company gave credit
on used automobile connecting rods in the sale of reground or re-
worked rods, it was held that the credit given for the old rods
was required to be considered a part of the price in computing the
tax.6
2
THE TIDE TURNS-REPEAL ENACTMENTS OF 1964 AND 1965
By 1964, the situation was intolerable what with the multitude
of problems associated with its widening scope; with the concept
61. 1962-1 Cum. Bull. 216.
62. Clawson & Bals v. United States, 182 F.2d 402 (Cir. Ill. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 883.
of "manufacturer, producer, or importer;" with "rebuilding" vs.
"reconditioning" or "repairing;" with identifying "parts or acces-
sories" for the purposes of the section; with precisely what is "the
price for which so sold;" and with its impact being felt primarily
by large numbers of small businesses.
By 1964 countless numbers of Service audits were in process,
most of them unresolved over the technical difficulties associated
with the above problems, and characterized by haggling between
the taxpayers and the Service. The worst problems, within the
entire problem area, were those involving the concepts of "rebuild-
ing" and "reconditioning" and "repairing." These, in particular,
involved smaller companies whose record keeping, on the whole,
was not characterized by the kind of sophistication ultimately nec-
essary for the resolution of many of the questions that had to
arise in auditing what is presumably a "rebuilder."
On October 13, 1964, Congress enacted Public Law Number 88-653
removing the tax on rebuilt parts and accessories. This was ac-
complished by adding Section 4063(c) to the Internal Revenue
Code.0 3 The repeal was made effective as of January 1, 1965.
Of special importance in assessing what, to the automotive parts
rebuilders, was a landmark enactment, is the legislative intent
clearly expressed by Congress as to what motivated the repeal.
This expression is reflected in Senate Report Number 1251, 88th
Congress, 2d Session, reproduced in Appendix C. The reasons
given for the repeal, and some of them are essentially reasons that
may be advanced to support arguments for the repeal of the tax
on light truck parts, may be summarized as follows:
1) There are difficulties associated with distinguishing between
rebuilding and reconditioning and, in a dynamic setting, in satis-
factorily defining "rebuilding." This has resulted in both disputes
between the industry and the Service and in confusion and uncer-
tainty as to the tax status of some processes.
2) The large number of small companies in the field are inor-
dinately burdened trying to comply with the tax.
3) The tax is particularly objectionable in its regressive nature
among consumers, its impact being felt more heavily by lower in-
come groups for whom the purchase of these parts is a necessity.
4) The revenue involved is only eight million dollars per year,
a small amount for so much trouble.
63. See note 2, supra, for text of this section.
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The second significant repeal enactment was Public Law Num-
ber 89-44, Section 201(b) (2), enacted by the 89th Congress in its
first session in 1965. This bill repealed the manufacturers' excise
tax on all automobile parts and accessories effective January 1,
1966, allowing the tax to remain on the vehicles themselves, both
automobiles and trucks, and on truck parts and accessories.
Of particular significance, insofar as this Comment is concerned,
is the legislative intent which motivated Congress to enact the re-
peal.
The present excise taxes, for the most part, were initially levied
as emergency revenue-raising measures at the time of the Korean
War or World War II, or the depression of the 1930's. As a result,
they were not developed on any systematic basis and are often
discriminatory in their application to the taxed industries or to the
purchasers of the taxed products.6 4
• . . Consumers of the taxed products where the tax is passed for-
ward must pay a premium, over and above the market price, for
the taxed items, which consumers of untaxed items do not pay.
These selective excise taxes tend to reduce sales and therefore re-
duce incomes and jobs in the industries which produce the taxed
goods. In these ways, selective excise taxation results in arbitrary
and undesirable distortions in the allocation of resources and in
this manner interferes with the free play of our competitive mar-
ket.
Many of these excises also now are objectionable in that they are
generally regressive in their impact, absorbing a larger share of
the income of low income persons than of those with higher in-
comes. This stems from the fact that low-income families find it
necessary to spend a higher proportion of their incomes for con-
sumption than those with larger incomes. Moreover, the present
system of manufacturers' excises tends to impose heavier tax bur-
dens on newly formed families which must invest heavily in pur-
chases of appliances and other taxed commodities.
Another undesirable aspect of the selective excise taxes is that
many of them are imposed on items used in business. Such taxes
place arbitrary tax burdens on firms depending on their require-
ments for taxed items. Moreover, these business cost taxes may dis-
courage the use of the most advanced and efficient machines or
other products, and their inclusion in costs of the business intro-
duce price distortions in markets for final goods and services.
Since these costs tend to be reflected in the prices of final or end
consumer products, they probably in their impact are also regres-
sive.
In many instances the selective excises also create heavy compli-
ance burdens. The imposition of Federal excises on a variety of
64. H. Rep. No. 433, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., 1965 U.S. Code Cong. and
Ad. News 1645.
relatively inexpensive commodities burdens retailers and manu-
facturers with compliance duties which are often disproportion-
ately heavy, viewed in relation to the revenues produced by the
taxes. Moreover, this burden tends to be heavier for smaller busi-
nesses. Removal of this burden, a hidden cost of taxation, will
free businessmen to spend more time managing their own af-
fairs. 65
For additional relevant commentary by the House Committee see
Appendix D.
In summary, what Congress has said in connection with the re-
peal of the manufacturers' excise tax on automobile parts and ac-
cessories is as follows:
1) The taxes, levied as emergency revenue-raising devices, were
not developed systematically and were often discriminatory to pro-
ducers and consumers.
2) Price increases necessitated by the discriminatory taxes re-
sulted in reduced sales, incomes, and employment in the taxed in-
dustries and also impaired the ability of the taxed industries to
compete in a free market.
3) The taxes were regressive in that they placed proportion-
ately heavier burdens on low income persons than on those with
higher incomes and also on newly formed families than on older
established ones.
4) The taxes discouraged business in investments in more ad-
vanced and more efficient machinery because profits that other-
wise might be available for development and modernization go to
the taxes, instead.
5) Selective excises place heavy compliance burdens on pro-
ducers, burdens frequently out of proportion to the revenues the
taxes produce. Furthermore, the compliance burdens are gener-
ally shouldered by smaller businesses less able to stand them. As
one consequence of this, less time is devoted to management activ-
ities than would be the case if these burdens were removed with
resulting benefit all around.
6) There is a strong inference that the sequence of tax re-
moval steps should be, first, removal of the tax on parts and ac-
cessories and then removal of the tax on the vehicles, not the other
way around.
7) The tax revenue derived from all truck parts and accessories
upon which the tax was retained was twenty million dollars per
year.
65. Id., at 1655.
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REPEAL ENACTMENT OF 1971
Up to 1971, the repeal sequence had been, first, the elimination
of the tax on rebuilt parts and accessories and, second, the elimi-
nation of the tax on all automobile parts and accessories. The tax
on automobiles and trucks was still effective. Then, in the Reve-
nue Act of 1971, the tax imposed on automobiles and on light-
duty trucks was removed. 6  Light-duty trucks were defined as
those "having a gross vehicle weight of ten thousand pounds or
less (as determined under regulations prescribed by the Secretary
or his delegate) .,67 Basically, this included one half and three
quarter ton pickup trucks.
The reasons for excluding light-duty trucks from the imposition
of the tax, insofar as Congress was concerned,68 were as follows:
1) Light-duty trucks, to a substantial degree, are used by farm-
ers and other individuals for the same purposes as passenger auto-
mobiles. 69 It is logical, therefore, from an excise tax point of view
that they should be exempt from the tax if passenger automobiles
are.
2) "The action taken in this bill continues the trend begun in
1965 to repeal excise taxes which place discriminatory tax burdens
on the consumers and producers of the taxed products.
' 70
3) To preserve the passenger automobile treatment, for the pur-
poses of consistency, the bill exempted ambulances and hearses
from the tax.71
The reversal of the manufacturers excise tax trend which had
commenced in 1965, with the repeal of the tax on rebuilt parts and
accessories, was almost complete and almost logically consistent,
with the enactment of Public Law Number 92-178. Parts first and
then the vehicles themselves had finally been made exempt from
the tax.
In the light of the above, the treatment accorded to the parts and
accessories of light trucks sold separately from the trucks them-
66. Pub. L. No. 92-178, § 401.
67. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 4061 (a) (2).
68. H. Rep. No. 92-533, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 1971 U.S. Code Cong. and
Ad. News 1866.
69. Id., at 1826, 1831.
70. Id., at 1831.
71. Id., at 1867.
selves is startling in its incongruity. As a result of the 1971 enact-
ment, light trucks are exempt from the tax along with the truck
parts and accessories included as original equipment on the truck
when it is first sold. Yet, these same parts and accessories are sub-
ject to the excise tax when sold separately from the truck.
This is an anomalous situation in that automobiles and/or their
parts and accessories are exempt from the manufacturers excise
tax. Light trucks also have been excluded by the 1971 Act because
they are used by farmers and others like automobiles and are,
therefore, treated like automobiles for excise tax purposes. Yet,
the replacement parts and after-market accessories for light trucks
continue to be taxable.
The reason that this legislative result occurs can be seen from a
perusal of Section 4061(b) (2) in Appendix A as that section reads
just prior to and then after the Revenue Act of 1971. Note that,
in subsection (2) just prior to the Revenue Act of 1971, the tax ex-
clusion is applicable to "any article enumerated in subsection
(a) (2) . . ." The Revenue Act of 1971 added light-duty trucks to
subsection (a) (2) but then, inexplicably, eliminated the words,
"any article enumerated in subsection (a) (2) . . ." from subsection
(b) (2) and substituted, in their place, an explicitly designated
group of exclusions which did not include light-duty trucks.
LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS
Starting with the first repeal enactment in 1964, Congress-has
consistently made clear its attitude towards manufacturers excise
taxes on automotive parts and accessories and has acted in con-
cert with that expressed attitude from 1964 to the present except
with regard to the limited category, truck parts and accessories.
What Congress has effectively said about these taxes is:
1) They were initially levied as emergency revenue-raising
measures during periods of crisis.
2) They were not developed on any systematic basis.
3) They were often discriminatory in their application to the
taxed industries and to the purchasers of the taxed products caus-
ing reduced sales, incomes, and employment in the taxed indus-
ries.
4) They imposed a particular burden on the large number of
what are on the whole small companies trying to comply with the
tax in its complex ramifications. Removal of the burden will free
businessmen to spend more time managing their own affairs.
[VoL. 1: 234, 1974] Manufacturers' Excise Tax
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
5) They are regressive taxes in their impact on consumers, being
felt more heavily by lower income groups than by higher income
groups.
6) The revenues involved are small for the amount of trouble
they create both for the taxpayer in his effort to comply and the
Service in its enforcement activities.
7) They have throttled progress towards efficiency, develop-
ment, and modernization of the businesses involved.
Objectively, the history of the manufacturers excise taxes has
been characterized by:
1) Low revenues relative to the amount of effort involved in
establishing practical definitive standards for enforcement and
compliance. The multitudes of problems that arose and remained
around the concepts of rebuilding v. reconditioning v. repairing,
of what and who is a manufacturer, of what are parts and acces-
sories for the purposes of the tax, and of the complex doctrines
defining price give testimony to this fact.
2) A plethora of disputes between taxpayers and the Service
and constant confusion as to bases for their resolution.
3) A steady attenuation of the scope of the taxes from 1964 on.
4) A continuing expansion of the number of articles exempted
from the taxes until, at present, very few remain, relatively speak-
ing.
Specifically as to light trucks:
1) Congress has decided to treat them like automobiles because
of the purposes they serve for their owners. Accordingly, Congress
has removed the tax on the light trucks but has neglected to do so
on truck parts and accessories although doing so on automobile
parts and accessories.
2) Total truck parts tax revenues in 1965 were only twenty mil-
lion dollars, only a portion of which were derived from the parts
of light trucks.
3) In the entire history of the manufacturers excise tax, this
is the only time the tax on a vehicle has been removed without
the prior removal of the tax on that vehicle's parts and accessories.
Viewed in the context of all of the foregoing, there is no justi-
fication for retaining the tax as it now exists. It is recommended
that Congress repeal Part I of Subchapter A of Chapter 32 of 26
United States Code, thereby eliminating the manufacturers excise
tax from all motor vehicles and their parts and accessories.
At the very least, the parts and accessories of light trucks should
be exempted from the manufacturers excise tax. This can be ac-
complished by amending Section 4061(b) (2) to read as follows:
(2) No tax shall be imposed under this subsection upon any part
or accessory which is suitable for use (and ordinarily is used) on
or in connection with, or as a component part of, [any article enu-
merated in subsection (a) (2) ], any chassis or body for a passenger
automobile, any chassis or body for a trailer or semi-trailer suitable
for use in connection with a passenger automobile, or a house
trailer.
The bracketed portion inserted into the present section as shown
would accomplish the purpose and would effect the suggested cor-
rection of the statute.
JEROME L. BLEIWEIS
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Appendix A
Wording of Internal Revenue Code, Section 4061 (b) and its prede-
cessors at various significant states of its history.
Acts June 6, 1932, Section 606.
There is hereby imposed upon the following articles sold
by the manufacturer, producer, or importer, a tax equiv-
alent to the following percentages of the price for which so
sold:
(a) Automobile truck chassis and automobile truck bodies
(including in both cases parts or accessories therefor sold
on or in connection therewith or with the sale thereof), two
per centum. A sale of an automobile truck shall, for the
purposes of this subsection, be considered to be a sale of the
chassis and of the body.
Amendment of above by Revenue Act of 1938.
(a) Automobile truck chassis, automobile truck bodies,
tractors of the kind chiefly used for highway transporta-
tion in combination with a trailer or semi-trailer (includ-
ing in each of the above cases parts or accessories therefor
sold on or in connection therewith or with the sale there-
of), two per centum. A sale of an automobile truck shall,
for the purposes of this subsection, be considered to be a
sale of the chassis and of the body.
(b) Other automobile chassis and bodies and motorcycles
(including in each case parts or accessories therefor sold
on or in connection therewith or with the sale thereof), ex-
cept tractors, three per centum. A sale of an automobile
shall, for the purposes of this subsection, be considered to
be a sale of the chassis and of the body.
(c) Parts or accessories (other than tires and inner tubes)
for any of the articles enumerated in subsection (a) or (b),
two per centum. For the purposes of this subsection and
subsections (a) and (b), spark plugs, storage batteries,
leaf springs, coils, timers, and tire chains, which are suita-
ble for uses on or in connection with, or as component parts
of any of the articles enumerated in subsection (a) or (b),
shall be considered parts or accessories for such articles,
whether or not primarily adapted for such use. This sub-
section shall not apply to chassis or bodies for automobile
trucks or other automobiles . . ..
Internal Revenue Code of 1939, Chapter 29, Subchapter A, 26 United
States Code Annotated, Section 3403 (c) at October 1, 1955, through
the end of the 1st Session, 84th Congress.
There shall be imposed upon the following articles sold
by the manufacturer, producer, or importer, a tax equiva-
lent to the following percentages of the price for which so
sold: ...
(c) Parts or accessories (other than tires and inner tubes
and other than radio or television receiving sets) for any
of the articles enumerated in subsection (a) or (b), eight
per centum except that on and after April 1, 1955, the rate
shall be five per centum. For the purposes of this subsec-
tion and subsections (a) and (b), spark plugs, storage bat-
teries, leaf springs, coils, timers, and tire chains, which are
suitable for use on or in connection with, or as component
parts of, any of the articles enumerated in subsection (a)
or (b), shall be considered parts or accessories for such
articles, whether or not primarily adapted for such use.
This subsection shall not apply to chassis or bodies for
automobile trucks or other automobiles.... In determin-
ing the sale price of a rebuilt automobile part or accessory
there shall be excluded from the price, in accordance with
regulations prescribed by the Secretary, the value of a like
part or accessory accepted in exchange.
(Note: On October 13, 1964, Public Law Number 88-653 repealed
the tax on rebuilt parts and accessories by adding Section 4063 (c).)
Section 4061 (b) just prior to Revenue Act of 1971, Public Law Num-
ber 92-178.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), there is hereby
imposed upon parts or accessories (other than tires and in-
ner tubes) for any of the articles enumerated in subsection
(a) (1) sold by the manufacturer, producer, or importer a
tax equivalent to eight percent of the price for which so
sold, except that on and after October 1, 1972, the rate
shall be five percent.
(2) No tax shall be imposed under this subsection upon
any part or accessory which is suitable for use (and ordin-
arily is used) on or in connection with, or as a component
part of, any article enumerated in subsection (a) (2) or a
house trailer.
Section 4061 (b) after Revenue Act of 1971, Public Law Number
92-178.
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), there is hereby
imposed upon parts or accessories (other than tires and
inner tubes) for any of the articles enumerated in sub-
section (a) (1) sold by the manufacturer, producer, or im-
porter a tax equivalent to eight percent of the price for
which so sold, except that on and after October 1, 1977, the
rate shall be five percent.
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(2) No tax shall be imposed under this subsection upon
any part or accessory which is suitable for use (and ordin-
arily is used) on or in connection with, or as a component
part of, any chassis or body for a passenger automobile,
any chassis or body for a trailer or semi-trailer suitable for
use in connection with a passenger automobile, or a house
trailer.
Appendix B
Section 48.4061(b)-3 Rebuilt, Reconditioned, Or Repaired Parts
Or Accessories.
(a) Rebuilt parts or accessories. Rebuilding of automobile
parts or accessories, as distinguished from reconditioning or
repairing, constitutes manufacturing, and the rebuilder of
such parts or accessories is liable for the tax imposed by
Section 4061 (b) with respect to his sales of such rebuilt
parts or accessories. Reboring or other machining, rewind-
ing, and comparable major operations constitute rebuild-
ings. The person owning the part or accessory being rebuilt
is the manufacturer of the article and is liable for the tax
on his sale of the rebuilt part or accessory. The tax at-
taches whether the machining or other operation is per-
formed by the rebuilder himself or by some other person
in his behalf. For example, the tax attaches with respect
to sales of (1) rebuilt batteries, (2) rebabbitted or ma-
chined connecting rods, (3) reassembled clutches after
operations such as the resurfacing of clutch plates, (4) re-
wound armatures, (5) reassembled generators with arma-
tures rewound by or for the person reassembling the gen-
erator, (6) reground or remetalized crankshafts, and (7)
engines in which blocks are machined (such as cylinders
rebored) or new blocks installed. For provisions re-
lating to the sale price of rebuilt parts or accessories, see
Section 48.4062 (b) -1.
(b) Reconditioned parts or accessories. The mere dis-
assembling, cleaning, and reassembling (with any neces-
sary replacements of worn parts) of automobile parts or
accessories, such as fuel pumps, water pumps, carburetors,
distributors, shock absorbers, windshieldwiper motors,
brake shoes, clutch discs, voltage regulators, and other parts
or accessories, are regarded as reconditioning operations
rather than the manufacturing or production of rebuilt
parts or accessories. The sale of a reconditioned part or ac-
cessory is not subject to tax if previous to the recondition-
ing there had been a prior sale of such part or accessory
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in the United States. Any new taxable parts or accessories
produced, or purchased tax free for use in further manu-
facture, and used as replacements in reconditioning such
units are subject to tax when used by the reconditioner.
(c) Repaired parts or accessories. The tax does not apply
to the amount paid for the repair of automobile parts or
accessories for the owner thereof. Repairing consists of
the restoration, whether by rebuilding or reconditioning, of
an owner's part or accessory to useable condition for his
own use rather than for sale. The person who performs
the repairing must retain in his possession evidence or doc-
uments from which the nontaxable nature of the operation
can be ascertained. Any person engaged in rebuilding
parts or accessories for purposes of sale incurs liability for
tax with respect to his own use of any part or accessory
rebuilt by him for sale.
Appendix C
Senate Report Number 1251, 88th Congress, 2d Session, 1964-2 Cum.
Bull. 870, 872.
REPEAL OF TAX ON REBUILT AUTO PARTS
Present law imposes an excise tax of eight percent (sched-
uled to revert to five percent as of July 1, 1965) on the
sale of automobile parts and accessories by the manufac-
turer. Under longstanding regulations, this tax has been
held to apply to rebuilt parts and accessories on the grounds
that the rebuilding constitutes "manufacturing." This
taxable status of rebuilt parts has been recognized by Con-
gress in that it has provided that the sales price of rebuilt
automobile parts or accessories is not to include the value
of a like part traded in on the rebuilt part.
Although rebuilding of automotive parts is subjected to the
manufacturers' excise tax on automotive parts and acces-
sories, the regulations make it clear that reconditioning is
not. Reconditioning, as contrasted to rebuilding, is the
mere disassembling, cleaning, and reassembling (includ-
ing any necessary replacement of worn parts). In practice
it has frequently been difficult to distinguish between re-
conditioning and rebuilding. This has proved particularly
difficult because reconditioning or rebuilding processes
have not remained static but have continued to change.
As a result, there has been a continuing dispute between
the rebuilding industry and the Internal Revenue Service
as to what constitutes taxable and nontaxable operations.
The result has led to confusion and uncertainty as to the
tax status of some processes, with some rebuilders paying
tax on some processes and others not paying on substan-
tially the same processes.
In addition to the troublesome administrative problems
arising in defining what constitutes a taxable operation,
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the large number of small rebuilders scattered throughout
the country are burdened in trying to comply with the tax.
This tax also is particularly objectionable in that its dis-
tribution among consumers is undoubtedly highly regres-
sive. Certainly more than a proportionate part of the pur-
chasers of automotive rebuilt parts (as distinct from new
parts) are made by those with relatively low incomes; thus,
the impact of the tax is believed to be heavily concentrated
on the lower income groups. Moreover, since the revenue
involved in this case amounts to only approximately eight
million dollars a year, your committee does not believe
that it is necessary to await consideration of all excise taxes
before acting with respect to this small, but troublesome,
problem.
Your committee's amendment exempts rebuilt auto parts
from this tax as of the beginning of the first calendar quar-
ter beginning after the date of enactment of this bill.
Appendix D
House Report Number 433, 89th Congress, 1st Session, 1965 United
States Code Congress and Ad. News 1666.
2. Automobile parts and accessories (Section 201 of the bill
and Section 4061 of the Code).
Generally, parts and accessories for automobile trucks, etc.
are, when sold separately, presently subject to an eight per-
cent tax based upon the manufacturer's or importer's price.
Tires and inner tubes and automobile radio and television
receiving sets presently are subject to other taxes in lieu of
the auto parts tax. However, to the extent of the manu-
facturer's markup on these parts, the auto tax in effect ap-
plies here also.
Your committee concluded that the automobile parts and
accessories tax is an undesirable tax because it is regressive
in its impact on the incomes of purchasers and also on the
grounds that an estimated thirty percent of this tax repre-
sents a business cost item. In addition, this tax presents
serious compliance and administrative burdens in large
part because of the large number of taxpayers. It is esti-
mated that there are close to eight thousand manufacturers
or importers of automobile parts and accessories, which is
many times the number of taxpayers involved in any other
manufacturers' excise tax except those on gasoline.
For the reasons indicated above, your committee's bill re-
peals the general eight percent tax on automobile parts and
accessories. However, parts and accessories included as
original equipment on automobiles will continue to be in-
cluded in the base of the passenger car tax as long as that
tax remains applicable. Although the ten percent radio
and television set tax is repealed effective July 1, 1965, the
eight percent auto parts and accessories tax will apply to
these automobile radio and television sets for the period
from July 1, 1965, to January 1, 1966, the date of the re-
peal of the general tax on automobile parts and accessories.
Your committee's bill, although repealing the general tax
on automobile parts and accessories, retains the present
eight percent manufacturers' tax on truck and bus parts
and accessories. Since the tax on trucks and buses is con-
sidered a highway user charge and allocated to the highway
trust fund, your committee believes that it is also appro-
priate to classify the tax on truck and bus parts as a high-
way user charge. In addition it believes that attempts
might be made to avoid the truck tax by selling parts
separately if no tax were imposed on truck parts. The bill,
therefore, retains this tax and assigns it to the highway
trust fund effective January 1, 1966.
The taxable truck or bus part or accessory is one which is
not suitable for use (or ordinarily used) on or in connec-
tion with, or as a component part of a passenger automobile
(or trailer used with a passenger car) or house trailer.
Under this definition parts and accessories which are used
interchangeably on automobiles and trucks (or buses) will
not be taxed. For example, a battery which ordinarily is
used in either an automobile or a light truck will not be
taxed as a truck part although a heavy duty battery which
ordinarily is used only in a truck will be so taxed.
The eight percent manufacturer's excise tax on automotive
parts and accessories is continued by your committee's
bill during the remainder of 1965. At that time, the general
parts and accessories tax is repealed but the eight percent
tax will continue to apply to truck parts and accessories
until October 1, 1972, at which time the rate will revert to
the permanent rate of five percent.
Your committee's bill makes provision for floor stock re-
funds with respect to parts and accessories (other than
truck parts and accessories) held in dealer's inventories on
January 1, 1966. In general, the procedure for claiming
such a refund is the same as that outlined in the case of the
passenger car tax. The refunds or credits must be claimed
from the Government by the manufacturer or importer and
he must base this claim upon a request submitted to him by
the dealer who held the inventory stock on the date of the
elimination of the tax. The manufacturer or importer must
also have reimbursed the dealer for the tax or have obtained
his consent to the allowance of the credit or refund from
the Government.
[VOL. 1: 234, 1974] Manufacturers' Excise Tax
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
It is estimated that the repeal of the tax on parts and ac-
cessories for passenger automobiles will reduce revenues
by two hundred thirty million dollars a year. Assignment
of the revenues derived from the tax on truck parts and
accessories to the highway trust fund will reduce general
fund revenues by an additional twenty million dollars a
year, but increase the revenues of the highway trust fund
by a like amount.
